BayAg_14 said:

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Odor has reached Manvel.

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may have to cut oil production?

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CDUB98 said:

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may have to cut oil production?

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You sure you know how a refinery works?

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The CSB's update states that on the day of the incident two contract workers at the refinery partially opened a flanged connection on piping containing hydrogen sulfide gas, which caused the release. One of these workers was fatally injured. The work was supposed to be done on a different, isolated piping segment located about five feet away from the flange that was opened. Two other contract workers from a separate company, who were working on equipment less than 250 feet away and downwind from the release, were also affected, with one fatally injured from the hydrogen sulfide exposure.

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sts7049 said:

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https://www.csb.gov/us-chemical-safety-board-releases-investigation-update-into-fatal-hydrogen-sulfide-release-at-pemex-deer-park-refinery-in-deer-park-texas/

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The CSB's update states that on the day of the incident two contract workers at the refinery partially opened a flanged connection on piping containing hydrogen sulfide gas, which caused the release. One of these workers was fatally injured. The work was supposed to be done on a different, isolated piping segment located about five feet away from the flange that was opened. Two other contract workers from a separate company, who were working on equipment less than 250 feet away and downwind from the release, were also affected, with one fatally injured from the hydrogen sulfide exposure.

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sts7049 said:

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Sooper Jeenyus said:

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Well, to be fair, pretty much all the real work gets contracted, so yeah.

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yep. and it isn't the contractor that issues the work permit.

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The work was supposed to be done on a different, isolated piping segment located about five feet away from the flange that was opened.

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txags92 said:

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Sooper Jeenyus said:

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Well, to be fair, pretty much all the real work gets contracted, so yeah.

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This. When I worked for DuPont, the plant bonuses were tied to their lack of osha reportables or lost work days. So any task with any hint of risk was outsourced to contractors. Wasn't rare to see the sign at the front gate of the plant showing last lost workday for employees >10 years, and the last lost workday for contractors <10 days.

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txags92 said:

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Sooper Jeenyus said:

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Well, to be fair, pretty much all the real work gets contracted, so yeah.

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This. When I worked for DuPont, the plant bonuses were tied to their lack of osha reportables or lost work days. So any task with any hint of risk was outsourced to contractors. Wasn't rare to see the sign at the front gate of the plant showing last lost workday for employees >10 years, and the last lost workday for contractors <10 days.

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Positive Equipment Identification. PEMEX Deer Park did not establish an adequate method to clearly identify the equipment that Repcon workers were to open before the work was authorized to begin. PEMEX Deer Park's procedures required operators to prepare a drawing and a list of piping flanges to open, but the piping flanges could not be identified using these documents alone. To aid the contractors, operators hung identification tags to indicate each flange that Repcon was to open. The tag for the intended flange was placed in a location that the Repcon workers did not see: on a platform railing above the intended flange. Due to the lack of a reliable method to identify the intended equipment, the Repcon workers searched for unlocked flange-locking devices, which they commonly observed elsewhere in the refinery.

Work Permitting and Hazard Control. PEMEX Deer Park's work permitting process was broad and did not control the hazards associated with opening piping in an operational unit. On the day of the incident, PEMEX Deer Park issued Repcon a broad-scope work permit that covered different jobs with different hazards and without clear, unambiguous hold points. As a result, the Repcon workers overlooked a written instruction in the permit to stop work and have a PEMEX Deer Park operator join them before opening hydrogen sulfide piping. Furthermore, the work permit did not evaluate or control the hazards of pipe opening activities directly upwind of a unit where many other contract workers were performing scheduled maintenance activities.

Turnaround Contractor Management. On the day of the incident, Repcon workers were reassigned from working on a shutdown, isolated, and emptied unit undergoing scheduled maintenance (called "turnaround") to working on the partially operational unit where the incident occurred. Due to the abrupt shift in the work environment and the proximity of the two units, the workers were not aware that they were working in a different unit or that the unit was operational and contained toxic hydrogen sulfide. Although PEMEX Deer Park had provided onboarding information to the Repcon workers about the precautions for working in the shutdown turnaround unit, PEMEX Deer Park did not inform the Repcon workers about the hazards associated with working in the operational unit before assigning them the flange opening task. As a result, the Repcon workers did not follow the usual precautions associated with working around live equipment.

Conduct of Operations. The CSB identified numerous instances where PEMEX Deer Park policies and procedures were not aligned with actual practices. These discrepancies were apparent in PEMEX Deer Park's standards for operators and management personnel. In many cases, PEMEX Deer Park's written documentation was consistent with industry guidance and accepted best practices. However, both management and operations personnel often misunderstood or were unaware of these expectations and frequently deviated from required practices. As a result, PEMEX Deer Park deviated from documented work permitting and hazard evaluation requirements, which contributed to the incident.

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CDUB98 said:

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The families of the deceased workers deserve to get paid. PEMEX Operations drastically failed according to that summary.

I've been present and coordinated many a vessel and line break. None of this would fly with me. 100% hazard and flange identification is a must. Every single damned little protocol MUST be followed or people die.

Repcon is not innocent either. The supervisor and foreman went along with it. They didn't protect their workers either.

100% preventable bull*****!

In case it's not obvious, I take worker safety seriously, and so does the company for whom I work.

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CDUB98 said:

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The families of the deceased workers deserve to get paid. PEMEX Operations drastically failed according to that summary.

I've been present and coordinated many a vessel and line break. None of this would fly with me. 100% hazard and flange identification is a must. Every single damned little protocol MUST be followed or people die.

Repcon is not innocent either. The supervisor and foreman went along with it. They didn't protect their workers either.

100% preventable bull*****!

In case it's not obvious, I take worker safety seriously, and so does the company for whom I work.

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