Lots of things get opened up if we expand this outside of the US activity. One from your list I think is unfair is the British surrender of Hong Kong. With as few resources as they had in theatre, there really wasn't a way they were going to hold it. It was probably a mistake sending the scant reinforcements they did.

Aggie1205 said:

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Lots of things get opened up if we expand this outside of the US activity. One from your list I think is unfair is the British surrender of Hong Kong. With as few resources as they had in theatre, there really wasn't a way they were going to hold it. It was probably a mistake sending the scant reinforcements they did.

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That's the mistake, right there - trying to shore up an undefensible position. The troops sent to Hong Kong could have been much more profitably used in Malaya or Burma.

The US made shades of a similar mistake in trying to shore up the Philippines, but they kind of did it half-assed. I do wonder if they would have tried at all if MacArthur hadn't been the commander in the Philippines. The approved version of War Plan Orange at the time simply called for holding Bataan and Corregidor as long as possible to deny Japan the ability to use Manila. And MacArthur tried to screw that up by attempting to stop the landings and Lingayen Gulf, before realizing he couldn't and pulling back, but without a lot of the supplies and prepared positions that should have been in place.

I agree it's a mistake, but due to the relatively small number of troops I don't think it rises to the level of a top 5 or even top 10 blunder.

The fall of the Philippines was not a "blunder" in my opinion. But if you do believe it was a blunder, it was not MacArthurs's but rather the policy of the government and the navy in the decades prior to war. The first blunder, as stated by General Clark in 1939, was in not immediately fortifying and garrisoning the Philippines and Guam once Japan denounced the Washington Treaty.

The navy never had interest in defending fixed points of land. Plans against Japan changed many times throughout the years. The 1936 Joint Board confirmed the sacrifice of the Philippines. Admiral Richardson hated Plan Orange. FDR fired him and replaced him with Admiral Stark who produced a plan that gave the Pacific lowest priority. The Rainbow Plans were created by the Joint Planning Committee in May 1939. But lets blame MacArthur for the fall.

The head of the Philippine Department before MacArthur was General Grunert. He had been revising the defense plan since July 1940. His plan called for beach defense using the regular army thus giving time for the Philippine army to mobilize. They would then relieve the army. This essentially became MacArthur's plan. General Grunert sent requests to the War Department for more supplies in mid 1940 and also sent 8 warning reports in July and August 1940 alone. They didn't provide him with anything but sympathy. But lets blame MacArthur for the fall.

The War Department decided in April 1941 to fight for the Philippines. Roosevelt then chose and recalled MacArthur. Shortly after MacArthur was recalled General Marshall told his staff "It was the policy of the U.S. to defend the Philippine Islands." At this time Plan Orange was officially removed from the register of plans. In October, Marshall informed MacArthur that revisions were being made to the plans which called for the defense of all the islands, not just Luzon, and approval was sent on 21 November. In addition to reinforcing the islands MacArthur requested reinforcements for the Philippine Army. Most of this was denied due to Lend-Lease and production schedules. But lets blame MacArthur for the fall.

Admiral Hart was enthusiastic about the Army's plan and wanted to keep the fleet in the Philippines. Secretary Knox said no on 20 November. Hart then began deploying the fleet farther south on 24 November. When war broke out the Pensacola convoy was in the Pacific. It made it to Australia on 22 December. Stark told Hart about the convoy but didn't mention that it was for the MacArthur. None of it ever made it to the Philippines. Later, MacArthur requested the use of subs to give relief on January 5. When asked, Hart said no subs were available. Gen. Marshall urged the use of submarines to supply the Philippines on January 17 to Gen. Wavell and Adm. Hart who both opposed this idea saying that it would reduce their ability to attack the Japanese. Marshall wrote to Adm. King about using submarines to supply MacArthur. King readily agreed. Ten subs made it. But lets blame MacArthur for the fall.

Aggie1205 said:

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Got a top 5 victories?

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Today marks the beginning of a top ETO victory

On July 25, Operation Cobra began. 3,000 American bombers flew over the German lines near St-L. Between them, they dropped 4,000 tons of napalm, high-explosives and fragmentation bombs. A five-mile stretch of German lines was devastated. The German commander estimated 70% of his men were put out of action; dead, wounded, or so traumatized they could no longer fight.

https://www.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii/operation-cobra-1944-breaking-normandy.html

Who was in charge when the Philippines fell?

You can white wash his errors all you want, but just like Kimmel and Short, who were also not given complete information, he was in fact in charge.

Could he have changed things, for sure. Did he? No, he kept the same plans in place, even losing a ton of supplies (mostly FOOD) to the Japanese b/c he did not plan well for the fall back to the Bataan peninsula.

Subs for supplies. That is just a logistical nightmare. Not only can they not carry even a days worth for the soldiers fighting, unloading them in the dark is a high risk, low reward operation. Everything is done by hand and it takes forever. You'd have just ended up with a bunch of sunk subs in at the docks and dead sailors.

Also, what was he doing after the Japanese attacked Pearly Harbor? Basically nothing for 9 hours.

Was it all his fault, no. At the end of the day short of getting 20,000 troops and lots of ammo and food to the Philippines in less than a week, it was going to fall. Trying to reinforce it would have resulting in a ton of lost soldiers, sailors and ships which at the time the US could not spare.

But he sure didn't help his troops out much. There was a reason his nickname was Dugout Doug.

MacArthur was good at self promotion, above all else.

I'm not whitewashing his errors. I never said he wasn't in charge. People that blame him for Clark field also want him to go straight to Bataan. This doesn't make sense. You want to immediately sacrifice all of your bases, all of your positions, all of your planes, and not give time for the Filipino reserves to activate. You would then say, "why didn't you stay and fight?".

"Subs for supplies. That is just a logistical nightmare."

Interesting opinion on submarine capabilities. But it's wrong. Submarines sent a lot of supplies to the Philippines throughout the war. For example, on one mission the Narwhal delivered 45 tons of supplies in 45 minutes. It included medical supplies, 1500 carbines, 10 cases of tommy guns, 375,000 rounds of ammunition. They then evacuated 23 people. All at night.

"Also, what was he doing after the Japanese attacked Pearly Harbor? Basically nothing for 9 hours."

Around 715am General Arnold told Brereton what had happened at Pearl Harbor. Around 8am bombers were ordered up without bombs. Around 830am a general alarm was sounded and Clark sent up most of their planes. They came back to Clark around 1130 to be loaded with bombs. Reports of incoming planes began coming in around 1130am. Nielson air base received the warning but it never got through to Clark. Not only was Clark attacked but we also had planes landing at Iba right when the Japanese attacked that base.

Before noon Admiral Glassford, commander of Task Force 5, flew to Iloilo, boarded the Houston and lead the Asiatic fleet out of the Philippines.

"But he sure didn't help his troops out much."

Didn't help out his troops? I think his preparation and his getting supplies for his troops is a big help. He got a coast artillery regiment, a thank battalion with 54 tanks. In August 50 more tanks and 50 more 75mm mounts were sent. He requested many supplies for the Filipinos including ten 250 bed hospitals, 500,000 C rations. Got 40 105mm guns which allowed 75 similar guns to be transferred to the Philippine Army. Received 1,000,000 gallons of gas. He requested warning equipment and established an air warning service. 2 radar sets were operational on December 8. 5 others hadn't been set up yet. On November 27 he extended and intensified air reconnaissance. I could on with more of what he was doing. Prior to this, people like the Governor General and Democrats, particularly Harold Ickes, were doing everything they could to oppose MacArthur.

"There was a reason his nickname was Dugout Doug."

To me it's ironic that people call him that yet that is exactly what you wanted him to do. Go dig yourselves in on Bataan.

Nothing MacArthur or anyone else could have done would have saved the Philippines. Given the realities of of pre-WWII military budgets and resources, there was no way to put adequate troops, naval and air forces, and fortifications in place, or to have trained and equipped the Philippine army, to hold against any Japanese attack determined to take the islands.

Maximum authorized strength for the US Army for most of the 1930s was in the range of 140,000, with actual troops strength usually around 125,000, give or take. Nowhere near enough to put an adequate force in the Philippines to actually defend them. There was also the not insignificant problem of all those Japanese controlled islands in the Central Pacific sitting astride the supply routes from the US to the PI.

War Plan Orange reflected those realities, when it gave the forces in the Philippines the simple task of denying the enemy the use of Manila Bay as long as possible. Holding out until a relief force arrived was not part of that plan, because the planners knew it wasn't going to happen.

That said, MacArthur could have done a better job. He overestimated the capabilities of the Philippine troops, and he should have started moving supplies and preparing defensive positions on Bataan as soon as it was known the Japanese were coming. Not to say he should have immediately moved all his troops there - but any forward defense should have been in the form of delaying actions, not trying to actually stop the IJA cold.

For probably the best discussion I've found on the loss of the B-17s on Dec 8, 1941, see this piece by Trent Telenko.

we found our MacArthur apologist.

War Plan Orange reflected those realities, when it gave the forces in the Philippines the simple task of denying the enemy the use of Manila Bay as long as possible. Holding out until a relief force arrived was not part of that plan, because the planners knew it wasn't going to happen.

That was an earlier version of WPO. Prior to recalling MacArthur, WPL46 of May 1941 required Admiral Hart to support the army in defense of the Philippines. The plan changed later to defend all of the Philippines. That is why they recalled MacArthur. If you are just going to defend Manila bay and sacrifice the Philippines then why recall MacArthur? Why start sending all of the weapons and supplies? Don't forget we had troops throughout the Philippines. Several islands had strong forces and were in good shape who did not want to surrender when Corregidor fell. The last prewar plans called for meeting the Japanese at the beach. This was started with General Grunert. It's also wrong to think that "planners" where 100% in agreement. Not all, but the majority of the navy had no interest in the Philippines. The Army was probably more evenly split between defending and sacrificing the Philippines. What matters is that Marshall told his staff, "It was the policy of the US to defend the Philippine Islands" and MacArthur developed plans to do so. But as he said he was given a mission that exceeded his capabilities.

That said, MacArthur could have done a better job. He overestimated the capabilities of the Philippine troops, and he should have started moving supplies and preparing defensive positions on Bataan as soon as it was known the Japanese were coming. Not to say he should have immediately moved all his troops there - but any forward defense should have been in the form of delaying actions, not trying to actually stop the IJA cold.

MacArthur did employ a delaying action. In the north of Luzon he first blew up the bridges in Balete pass to deny any Japanese coming from the mountains. He had a series of 5 delaying lines. The key was the last one to protect the Calumpit bridge to allow southern forces to get to Bataan. The southern Luzon force were also fighting a delaying action. Once they crossed the Culo bridge they blew it up the Japanese no longer could cut them off.

Wasn't Eisenhauer critical of McArthur's defense of the Philippines? Particularly, his failure to disperse his aircraft, among other mistakes?

not sure I think Marshueal was

What you found is someone who knows a lot more about MacArthur and the Philippines than you. I question everything that I read and dig into it. When an author passes judgement on something, which they are free to do, I question it. Especially if it's an author far removed from the source or far removed from the time that the event happened.

Wasn't Eisenhauer critical of McArthur's defense of the Philippines? Particularly, his failure to disperse his aircraft, among other mistakes?

This is the kind of question that I am talking about. You say that someone may have said something and take it as true without doing any thinking on your part. On December 6, MacArthur had told General Arnold that a full air alert was in place. All aircraft were dispersed and placed under guard to protect against sabotage. General Brereton made a note of this communication in his diary. On the night of the 7th a party was given in honor of General Brereton at which Rear Admiral Purnell stated that he believed that it was only a matter of days if not hours before the shooting started. General Brereton immediately told his chief of staff to place all air units on combat alert starting the morning of December 8.

Nothing MacArthur or anyone else could have done would have saved the Philippines.

I agree with this statement for the situation on December 8 but disagree with your conclusion. To state that nobody could have saved the Philippines and then blame MacArthur for not saving the Philippines isn't logically consistent. The strength of our position in early December was not enough to stop the fall. However, it was increasing every day and in a few months time it could have been enough. General Brereton didn't arrive until November 3. A lot of the planes only had a couple of hours on them. Some that showed up for assembly came without guns. Over 1,100,000 tons of supplies were in port waiting for shipment. There were 35 B-17s in the Philippines on December 8. By March 1942 there were to be 165. By the end of December they were to have 240 fighters.

War Plan Orange reflected those realities, when it gave the forces in the Philippines the simple task of denying the enemy the use of Manila Bay as long as possible.

I would not say denying Manila Bay to the Japanese a simple task. The original plan, which a lot of people think we should have stuck to, called for falling back to Bataan and using that position along with Corregidor, Fort Drum, Fort Frank and Fort Hughes to protect the bay. MacArthur disagreed with this plan and stated that you could not defend the bay if you allowed the enemy to land on Luzon or any of the other Philippine islands, especially in the age of the airplane. This is when he requested a change from a citadel type defense to an active defense. The original plan also had the problem in that it ignored the Ternate area. An area the Japanese used to attack the bay and the forts.

The Joint Board approved plans that included the defense of all of the Philippines. Not just Manila bay. MacArthur was given the additional tasks of supporting the Navy in raiding Japanese sea communications and destroying Axis forces, conducting air raids within tactical operating radius, and to cooperate with the Associated Powers. The revision also increased the reserve from 90 days to 180 days. The planned 180 days was for 43,000 troops. At the time of the retreat to Bataan the troops numbered 80,000 plus around 26,000 civilians. Even if all of the supplies had made it to Bataan we were still in trouble. The Navy had the task to set up a defensive area around Manila and Subic Bays.

In the end they denied the Japanese the use of Manila Bay until the fall of Corregidor in May. 5 months. During that time Shanghai fell on December 8, Guam December 10, Wake December 22, Hong Kong on Christmas, and Singapore on February 15.

Surrender of Hong Kong much worse than Malta (which was never captured!)

TARAWA where the landing craft were all stuck on the outer reefs!

US Navy destroyed at Guadalcanal was a major disaster for the first two months.

Yes, because Eisenhauer was a lead on writing plan orange. One of the places he was recognized as a top organizer and with the ability to work with a multinational force. MacArthur abandoned that plan and chose to fight at bad locations without support after bleeding his men dry before even allowing them to engage the Japanese.

Instead of fighting an unproven force from dug in defensive positions while he men were still on full rations he retreated abandoning his food stores, ammunition and heavy guns. Leaving his men to retreat on half and then ultimately a quarter rations for months. Until finally there was nowhere else to go and then when the fight happened, on ground favorable to the attackers his men could barely hold their rifles up to fire them because they were all so emaciated.

Yes, Eisenhauer was critical of MacArthur's handling of the Philippines and rightfully so.

Guadalcanal was so very important because after Midway the Japs were still on the offensive. After Guadalcanal they weren't. There were 5 major sea battles and tactically we lost every one but strategically we won all. Some of those sea battles were at close, point-blank range with the most powerful weapons of the time. What courage those sailors had!!

Almost not worth responding to someone who can't even spell Eisenhower correctly. At the time there were war "Plans" and "Projects". War plans such as WPO-3 were the responsibility of the area commander. For the Philippines that would be the head of the Philippine Department. Eisenhower was never head of the Philippine Department and thus never wrote such plans. He worked with MacArthur in developing the Philippine Army. Additionally, I have a list of planners, Army and Navy, that were involved with war plan orange from 1906 to 1941. Eisenhower is not listed.

Eisenhower may not have physically written the plans but he was absolutely there as an independent evaluator and executor of the war games that developed those plans and set what was to be plan orange as the only way to defend the Philippines. MacArthur abandoned that plan and then put the losses on the shoulders of his subordinates.

Your use of ticky tacky details and spelling to attack my statement tells me everything I need to know. Continue to defend MacArthur and enjoy being on the wrong side of history.

You were wrong when you said Eisenhower was a lead planner. You're wrong saying that MacArthur abandoned plans. The plans were changed and approved. The plan you wanted him to follow was to go to Bataan. He went to Bataan. You then contradict yourself and say he fought on ground favorable to the enemy. You also state that plan orange was based on a war game and that it was the only way to defend the Philippines. This isn't right either. Plans were constantly debated, changed, and adapted from the early 1900s with many different people involved.

This is getting silly. You are missing the forest for the trees.
Yes the plan changed but even the latest rainbow plan was at it's core plan orange. MacArthur abandoned that plan with his decree that it was too defensive and defeatists and pushed his forces out to defend the entire chain of islands. Dividing them and leaving them open to destruction in detail. Then when the invasion came and threatened to cut off those forces they were forced to retreat and abandon their supplies and heavy weapons.

These are facts, they happened.

Yes, he retreated to Bataan eventually, which is exactly what all the war gaming showed as the best option to defend Manilla bay and hold out for reinforcements from the the US and UK. Except at this point the defenders had been on half rations for over a month and were quickly put on a quarter rations and had no heavy weapons to support them. They were also put into defensive positions that made no sense because MacArthur wanted to defend every inch of the Philippines and not trade land for time as he should have.

MacArthur never should have been returned to active service. He should have been left in the service of the Philippine government in command of the Philippine army only and the US Army should have been put under Wainwright who could have executed a defense in depth that would have slowed and possibly stopped the untested Japanese Army. Something that Gen. Vandergrift is able to do with a smaller and similarly equipped and far more under supported force on Guadalcanal 15 months later.

I'm also not sure where the denial that Eisenhower had anything to do with planning the defense of the Philippines is coming from. Eisenhower was MacArthur's aide in the Philippines until '39. He absolutely was part of writing plan orange and was responsible for executing the final set of large scale war games. The execution of which got him on Marshal's radar as a rising star and probably the main reason he was summoned back to DC in 1939.

Eisenhower served under MacArthur from 1935 to the end of 1939. Their job was to build up the Philippine Army. Not the U.S. Army. Eisenhower spent 2 to 3 hours everyday with President Quezon. Eisenhower requested to go back to the States in 1939 because war broke out in Europe in September. He believed the U.S. would get involved and he didn't want to miss it. To quote Eisenhower, "My entire life has been given to this one thing, my country…my profession. I want to be there if what I fear is going to come about actually happens."

The head of the Philippine Department writes the plans for how to defend the Philippines. From 1935 that was Kilbourne, Holbrook, Hughes, Grant, and then Grunert. Wainright led the Philippine Division under Grunert. Not sure why you want him instead of Grunert.

1933 to 1941 senior members of the Joint Army-Navy Board included MacArthur (until 1935), Malin Craig, George Marshall. The War Plans Division included Samuel Bryant, R.F. Dillen, George Eyers, Thomas Holcomb, William Pye, Royal Ingersoll, Robert Ghormley, Russell Crenshaw, Charles Cooke, Charles Moore, Harry Hill, Forrest Sherman, Oscar Smith, Richmond K. Turner.

The orange plan you are referring that called for going to Bataan had the mission to deny the use of Manila Bay to the Japanese. It was not to save the Philippines, as you stated earlier, as you can not do that from there. The plan changed to include ALL of the Philippines. This was approved by the Joint Board and Marshall as I have stated before.

MacArthur ordered the retreat to Bataan on December 23. The last soldier got there on January 5. That is when MacArthur ordered half rations. So they had not been on half rations for over a month as you incorrectly claim. The rations reached level on March 25.

Guadalcanal? The South Pacific Area had 10 cruisers, 28 destroyers, and 3 aircraft carriers. McCain's Task Force 63 had 291 planes. Guadalcanal is about 2,047 square miles whereas Luzon alone is 42,458 square miles (over 20x). At the beginning of the battle there were only around 2,230 Japanese on Guadalcanal. The Expeditionary Force had 82 ships and 19,000 men. Hardly similar to the Philippines at all. However, there is one similarity. In both places the Navy abandoned the troops.

as I stated, you're arguing with a MacArthur apologist.

And let me correct you again. I'm only posting facts and you don't like it because it doesn't align with your hatred of MacArthur. Here is the big picture. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 was to grant the Philippines independence after a 10 year transition period. They had no army and thus asked MacArthur to build one and he went in 1935 to do so. The Japanese were aware of this 10 year schedule. Tensions increased with Japan and by April 1941 the War Department decided to fight for the Philippines. When Japan moved on Indochina in July they recalled MacArthur and the build up began. April of 1942 was commonly viewed as the critical date for the build-up of the Philippines. So despite this you think the Philippines should not have fallen. Instead of providing anything of substance to refute this you instead call me an apologist. Twice. This tells me you have nothing to provide.

Let me correct you again, I never said it should not have fallen.

I don't hate him, just think he is grossly overrated and you're confirming that fact with your incessant defense of everything he did as it was the single only correct course of action. Fact is, he jacked up the defense of the Philippians and made it much worse than it should have been. Not that the Japanese would have been stopped, but the US Could have made it much more difficult if not for MacArthur's bumbling. He also spent more time on self promotion than actually leading his part of the war.

Should be on the mind blowing history fact thread, but at the age of 50 he brought back a 16yr old concubine from his first tour of the Philippians and locked her in a hotel room. Her duty was to "lay in bed".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elizabeth_Cooper

Quote:

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According to one biographer of MacArthur, William Manchester, MacArthur "showered [Cooper] with presents and bought her many lacy tea gowns, but no raincoat. She didn't need one, he told her; her duty lay in bed."

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YZ250 said:

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"Subs for supplies. That is just a logistical nightmare."

Interesting opinion on submarine capabilities. But it's wrong. Submarines sent a lot of supplies to the Philippines throughout the war. For example, on one mission the Narwhal delivered 45 tons of supplies in 45 minutes. It included medical supplies, 1500 carbines, 10 cases of tommy guns, 375,000 rounds of ammunition. They then evacuated 23 people. All at night.

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Narwhal delivered supplies to guerillas, not Manilla. Completely different situation in 1944 then an ongoing battle on Luzon and in Manilla in 1942.

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/n/narwhal-ii.html

Quote:

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Point, Panay. Proceeding into Pandan Bay on the night of 5 February, she transferred 45 tons of cargo ashore and embarked six new passengers. Shifting to Negros Island on 7 February, the boat delivered another 45 tons of supplies near Balatong Point. Narwhal then received 28 more evacuees for the trip back to Darwin.

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Per Wikipedia, a 300,000 man army needs 700T of supplies per day which equates to 186 for the 80,000 on Bataan. Lets cut that in half for the Bataan defenders since they were on half rations (MacArthur handed the rest to the Japanese) The ~80,000 troops on Bataan would need ~90+ tons PER DAY of supplies to sustain themselves and fight the Japanese. So they need 2 Narwhals PER DAY just to barely sustain defensive operations. And this was supposed to be delivered while the Japanese had complete control of the air and sea around Luzon? That's quite the fantasy scenario you've created for your hero.

The US also didn't have the resources or subs available to supply the troops on Bataan in any meaningful way in 1942.

If you're going to post "facts" at least get the story straight. But then, you're defending MacArthur and he never got his stories straight either.

Question for you guys much more knowledgeable than I am. What had McArthur done to justify appointing him commander of all Army forces in the SW Pacific? Yes, I know that he had been Chief of Staff of the Army, but Marshall seemed to have purged the Army of senior leadership and replaced them with younger, more dynamic guys (at least in Europe).

Why didn't Marshall also put a younger General in command of the Army in the SW Pacific? Were McArthur's WW I experience and accolades enough or did some other reason exist? Or was it the Army protecting its aristocracy?

Aggie1205 said:

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Got a top 5 victories?

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The Battle of the Falaise Pocket, which took place from August 12 to August 21,

The "Gap" and the "Death Corridor"
The plan was to close the gap between the two converging forces, but a delay in the advance of the American troops left a small escape route for the Germans. This was the "Falaise Gap" or "Falaise-Chambois Pocket."

As the pocket began to close, the German forces, consisting of infantry, armored units, and thousands of vehicles, were crammed into a small area. Allied artillery and airpower, with complete air superiority, relentlessly pounded the trapped German columns. The "death corridor" became a scene of unimaginable destruction, with dead soldiers, horses, and destroyed vehicles littering the landscape.

Outcome and Significance
On August 21, the pocket was finally sealed. The battle was a catastrophic defeat for Germany:
Casualties: The Germans suffered over 10,000 killed and 50,000 captured.

Material Losses: The German Army lost most of its tanks, artillery, and transport, effectively rendering its forces in the West incapable of mounting a significant defense.

Strategic Impact: The Battle of the Falaise Pocket marked the end of the Battle of Normandy and opened the door for the rapid Allied advance across France. The liberation of Paris followed just days later.