Lots of things get opened up if we expand this outside of the US activity. One from your list I think is unfair is the British surrender of Hong Kong. With as few resources as they had in theatre, there really wasn't a way they were going to hold it. It was probably a mistake sending the scant reinforcements they did.

Aggie1205 said:

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Lots of things get opened up if we expand this outside of the US activity. One from your list I think is unfair is the British surrender of Hong Kong. With as few resources as they had in theatre, there really wasn't a way they were going to hold it. It was probably a mistake sending the scant reinforcements they did.

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That's the mistake, right there - trying to shore up an undefensible position. The troops sent to Hong Kong could have been much more profitably used in Malaya or Burma.

The US made shades of a similar mistake in trying to shore up the Philippines, but they kind of did it half-assed. I do wonder if they would have tried at all if MacArthur hadn't been the commander in the Philippines. The approved version of War Plan Orange at the time simply called for holding Bataan and Corregidor as long as possible to deny Japan the ability to use Manila. And MacArthur tried to screw that up by attempting to stop the landings and Lingayen Gulf, before realizing he couldn't and pulling back, but without a lot of the supplies and prepared positions that should have been in place.

I agree it's a mistake, but due to the relatively small number of troops I don't think it rises to the level of a top 5 or even top 10 blunder.

The fall of the Philippines was not a "blunder" in my opinion. But if you do believe it was a blunder, it was not MacArthurs's but rather the policy of the government and the navy in the decades prior to war. The first blunder, as stated by General Clark in 1939, was in not immediately fortifying and garrisoning the Philippines and Guam once Japan denounced the Washington Treaty.

The navy never had interest in defending fixed points of land. Plans against Japan changed many times throughout the years. The 1936 Joint Board confirmed the sacrifice of the Philippines. Admiral Richardson hated Plan Orange. FDR fired him and replaced him with Admiral Stark who produced a plan that gave the Pacific lowest priority. The Rainbow Plans were created by the Joint Planning Committee in May 1939. But lets blame MacArthur for the fall.

The head of the Philippine Department before MacArthur was General Grunert. He had been revising the defense plan since July 1940. His plan called for beach defense using the regular army thus giving time for the Philippine army to mobilize. They would then relieve the army. This essentially became MacArthur's plan. General Grunert sent requests to the War Department for more supplies in mid 1940 and also sent 8 warning reports in July and August 1940 alone. They didn't provide him with anything but sympathy. But lets blame MacArthur for the fall.

The War Department decided in April 1941 to fight for the Philippines. Roosevelt then chose and recalled MacArthur. Shortly after MacArthur was recalled General Marshall told his staff "It was the policy of the U.S. to defend the Philippine Islands." At this time Plan Orange was officially removed from the register of plans. In October, Marshall informed MacArthur that revisions were being made to the plans which called for the defense of all the islands, not just Luzon, and approval was sent on 21 November. In addition to reinforcing the islands MacArthur requested reinforcements for the Philippine Army. Most of this was denied due to Lend-Lease and production schedules. But lets blame MacArthur for the fall.

Admiral Hart was enthusiastic about the Army's plan and wanted to keep the fleet in the Philippines. Secretary Knox said no on 20 November. Hart then began deploying the fleet farther south on 24 November. When war broke out the Pensacola convoy was in the Pacific. It made it to Australia on 22 December. Stark told Hart about the convoy but didn't mention that it was for the MacArthur. None of it ever made it to the Philippines. Later, MacArthur requested the use of subs to give relief on January 5. When asked, Hart said no subs were available. Gen. Marshall urged the use of submarines to supply the Philippines on January 17 to Gen. Wavell and Adm. Hart who both opposed this idea saying that it would reduce their ability to attack the Japanese. Marshall wrote to Adm. King about using submarines to supply MacArthur. King readily agreed. Ten subs made it. But lets blame MacArthur for the fall.

Aggie1205 said:

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Got a top 5 victories?

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Today marks the beginning of a top ETO victory

On July 25, Operation Cobra began. 3,000 American bombers flew over the German lines near St-L. Between them, they dropped 4,000 tons of napalm, high-explosives and fragmentation bombs. A five-mile stretch of German lines was devastated. The German commander estimated 70% of his men were put out of action; dead, wounded, or so traumatized they could no longer fight.

https://www.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii/operation-cobra-1944-breaking-normandy.html

Who was in charge when the Philippines fell?

You can white wash his errors all you want, but just like Kimmel and Short, who were also not given complete information, he was in fact in charge.

Could he have changed things, for sure. Did he? No, he kept the same plans in place, even losing a ton of supplies (mostly FOOD) to the Japanese b/c he did not plan well for the fall back to the Bataan peninsula.

Subs for supplies. That is just a logistical nightmare. Not only can they not carry even a days worth for the soldiers fighting, unloading them in the dark is a high risk, low reward operation. Everything is done by hand and it takes forever. You'd have just ended up with a bunch of sunk subs in at the docks and dead sailors.

Also, what was he doing after the Japanese attacked Pearly Harbor? Basically nothing for 9 hours.

Was it all his fault, no. At the end of the day short of getting 20,000 troops and lots of ammo and food to the Philippines in less than a week, it was going to fall. Trying to reinforce it would have resulting in a ton of lost soldiers, sailors and ships which at the time the US could not spare.

But he sure didn't help his troops out much. There was a reason his nickname was Dugout Doug.

MacArthur was good at self promotion, above all else.

I'm not whitewashing his errors. I never said he wasn't in charge. People that blame him for Clark field also want him to go straight to Bataan. This doesn't make sense. You want to immediately sacrifice all of your bases, all of your positions, all of your planes, and not give time for the Filipino reserves to activate. You would then say, "why didn't you stay and fight?".

"Subs for supplies. That is just a logistical nightmare."

Interesting opinion on submarine capabilities. But it's wrong. Submarines sent a lot of supplies to the Philippines throughout the war. For example, on one mission the Narwhal delivered 45 tons of supplies in 45 minutes. It included medical supplies, 1500 carbines, 10 cases of tommy guns, 375,000 rounds of ammunition. They then evacuated 23 people. All at night.

"Also, what was he doing after the Japanese attacked Pearly Harbor? Basically nothing for 9 hours."

Around 715am General Arnold told Brereton what had happened at Pearl Harbor. Around 8am bombers were ordered up without bombs. Around 830am a general alarm was sounded and Clark sent up most of their planes. They came back to Clark around 1130 to be loaded with bombs. Reports of incoming planes began coming in around 1130am. Nielson air base received the warning but it never got through to Clark. Not only was Clark attacked but we also had planes landing at Iba right when the Japanese attacked that base.

Before noon Admiral Glassford, commander of Task Force 5, flew to Iloilo, boarded the Houston and lead the Asiatic fleet out of the Philippines.

"But he sure didn't help his troops out much."

Didn't help out his troops? I think his preparation and his getting supplies for his troops is a big help. He got a coast artillery regiment, a thank battalion with 54 tanks. In August 50 more tanks and 50 more 75mm mounts were sent. He requested many supplies for the Filipinos including ten 250 bed hospitals, 500,000 C rations. Got 40 105mm guns which allowed 75 similar guns to be transferred to the Philippine Army. Received 1,000,000 gallons of gas. He requested warning equipment and established an air warning service. 2 radar sets were operational on December 8. 5 others hadn't been set up yet. On November 27 he extended and intensified air reconnaissance. I could on with more of what he was doing. Prior to this, people like the Governor General and Democrats, particularly Harold Ickes, were doing everything they could to oppose MacArthur.

"There was a reason his nickname was Dugout Doug."

To me it's ironic that people call him that yet that is exactly what you wanted him to do. Go dig yourselves in on Bataan.

Nothing MacArthur or anyone else could have done would have saved the Philippines. Given the realities of of pre-WWII military budgets and resources, there was no way to put adequate troops, naval and air forces, and fortifications in place, or to have trained and equipped the Philippine army, to hold against any Japanese attack determined to take the islands.

Maximum authorized strength for the US Army for most of the 1930s was in the range of 140,000, with actual troops strength usually around 125,000, give or take. Nowhere near enough to put an adequate force in the Philippines to actually defend them. There was also the not insignificant problem of all those Japanese controlled islands in the Central Pacific sitting astride the supply routes from the US to the PI.

War Plan Orange reflected those realities, when it gave the forces in the Philippines the simple task of denying the enemy the use of Manila Bay as long as possible. Holding out until a relief force arrived was not part of that plan, because the planners knew it wasn't going to happen.

That said, MacArthur could have done a better job. He overestimated the capabilities of the Philippine troops, and he should have started moving supplies and preparing defensive positions on Bataan as soon as it was known the Japanese were coming. Not to say he should have immediately moved all his troops there - but any forward defense should have been in the form of delaying actions, not trying to actually stop the IJA cold.

For probably the best discussion I've found on the loss of the B-17s on Dec 8, 1941, see this piece by Trent Telenko.

we found our MacArthur apologist.

War Plan Orange reflected those realities, when it gave the forces in the Philippines the simple task of denying the enemy the use of Manila Bay as long as possible. Holding out until a relief force arrived was not part of that plan, because the planners knew it wasn't going to happen.

That was an earlier version of WPO. Prior to recalling MacArthur, WPL46 of May 1941 required Admiral Hart to support the army in defense of the Philippines. The plan changed later to defend all of the Philippines. That is why they recalled MacArthur. If you are just going to defend Manila bay and sacrifice the Philippines then why recall MacArthur? Why start sending all of the weapons and supplies? Don't forget we had troops throughout the Philippines. Several islands had strong forces and were in good shape who did not want to surrender when Corregidor fell. The last prewar plans called for meeting the Japanese at the beach. This was started with General Grunert. It's also wrong to think that "planners" where 100% in agreement. Not all, but the majority of the navy had no interest in the Philippines. The Army was probably more evenly split between defending and sacrificing the Philippines. What matters is that Marshall told his staff, "It was the policy of the US to defend the Philippine Islands" and MacArthur developed plans to do so. But as he said he was given a mission that exceeded his capabilities.

That said, MacArthur could have done a better job. He overestimated the capabilities of the Philippine troops, and he should have started moving supplies and preparing defensive positions on Bataan as soon as it was known the Japanese were coming. Not to say he should have immediately moved all his troops there - but any forward defense should have been in the form of delaying actions, not trying to actually stop the IJA cold.

MacArthur did employ a delaying action. In the north of Luzon he first blew up the bridges in Balete pass to deny any Japanese coming from the mountains. He had a series of 5 delaying lines. The key was the last one to protect the Calumpit bridge to allow southern forces to get to Bataan. The southern Luzon force were also fighting a delaying action. Once they crossed the Culo bridge they blew it up the Japanese no longer could cut them off.

Wasn't Eisenhauer critical of McArthur's defense of the Philippines? Particularly, his failure to disperse his aircraft, among other mistakes?

not sure I think Marshueal was

What you found is someone who knows a lot more about MacArthur and the Philippines than you. I question everything that I read and dig into it. When an author passes judgement on something, which they are free to do, I question it. Especially if it's an author far removed from the source or far removed from the time that the event happened.

Wasn't Eisenhauer critical of McArthur's defense of the Philippines? Particularly, his failure to disperse his aircraft, among other mistakes?

This is the kind of question that I am talking about. You say that someone may have said something and take it as true without doing any thinking on your part. On December 6, MacArthur had told General Arnold that a full air alert was in place. All aircraft were dispersed and placed under guard to protect against sabotage. General Brereton made a note of this communication in his diary. On the night of the 7th a party was given in honor of General Brereton at which Rear Admiral Purnell stated that he believed that it was only a matter of days if not hours before the shooting started. General Brereton immediately told his chief of staff to place all air units on combat alert starting the morning of December 8.

Nothing MacArthur or anyone else could have done would have saved the Philippines.

I agree with this statement for the situation on December 8 but disagree with your conclusion. To state that nobody could have saved the Philippines and then blame MacArthur for not saving the Philippines isn't logically consistent. The strength of our position in early December was not enough to stop the fall. However, it was increasing every day and in a few months time it could have been enough. General Brereton didn't arrive until November 3. A lot of the planes only had a couple of hours on them. Some that showed up for assembly came without guns. Over 1,100,000 tons of supplies were in port waiting for shipment. There were 35 B-17s in the Philippines on December 8. By March 1942 there were to be 165. By the end of December they were to have 240 fighters.

War Plan Orange reflected those realities, when it gave the forces in the Philippines the simple task of denying the enemy the use of Manila Bay as long as possible.

I would not say denying Manila Bay to the Japanese a simple task. The original plan, which a lot of people think we should have stuck to, called for falling back to Bataan and using that position along with Corregidor, Fort Drum, Fort Frank and Fort Hughes to protect the bay. MacArthur disagreed with this plan and stated that you could not defend the bay if you allowed the enemy to land on Luzon or any of the other Philippine islands, especially in the age of the airplane. This is when he requested a change from a citadel type defense to an active defense. The original plan also had the problem in that it ignored the Ternate area. An area the Japanese used to attack the bay and the forts.

The Joint Board approved plans that included the defense of all of the Philippines. Not just Manila bay. MacArthur was given the additional tasks of supporting the Navy in raiding Japanese sea communications and destroying Axis forces, conducting air raids within tactical operating radius, and to cooperate with the Associated Powers. The revision also increased the reserve from 90 days to 180 days. The planned 180 days was for 43,000 troops. At the time of the retreat to Bataan the troops numbered 80,000 plus around 26,000 civilians. Even if all of the supplies had made it to Bataan we were still in trouble. The Navy had the task to set up a defensive area around Manila and Subic Bays.

In the end they denied the Japanese the use of Manila Bay until the fall of Corregidor in May. 5 months. During that time Shanghai fell on December 8, Guam December 10, Wake December 22, Hong Kong on Christmas, and Singapore on February 15.